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Psychopathy is a developmental disorder associated with core affective traits, such as
low empathy, guilt, and remorse, and with antisocial and aggressive behaviors. Recent
neurocognitive and neuroimaging studies of psychopathy in both institutionalized and
community samples have begun to illuminate the basis of this condition, in particular
the ways that psychopathy affects the experience and recognition of fear. In this review,
I will consider how understanding emotional processes in psychopathy can shed light
on the three questions central to the study of emotion: (1) Are emotions discrete,
qualitatively distinct phenomena, or quantitatively varying phenomena best described in
terms of dimensions like arousal and valence? (2) What are the brain structures involved
in generating specific emotions like fear, if any? And (3) how do our own experiences of
emotion pertain to our perceptions of and responses to others’ emotion? I conclude that
insights afforded by the study of psychopathy may provide better understanding of not only
fundamental social phenomena like empathy and aggression, but of the basic emotional
processes that motivate these behaviors.
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Emotion is the major driver of all human and animal behavior,
including social behavior—it is emotion that literally moves us
to seek or escape positive and negative consequences (LeDoux,
2012). Many unanswered questions remain about the nature of
human emotion and are the topic of vibrant ongoing debates: are
different emotions qualitatively distinct, emerging from separa-
ble neurobiological processes, or can emotions bemore accurately
described dimensionally in terms of arousal and valence (Russell
and Barrett, 1999; Barrett et al., 2007; Izard, 2007; Panksepp,
2007; LeDoux, 2012)? If distinct neurobiological events con-
tribute to the generation of different emotions, which brain
structures are most relevant to the emergence of these emo-
tions (Panksepp, 2007; Vytal and Hamann, 2010; Lindquist et al.,
2012)? And finally, how do emotions we experience pertain to our
perceptions of and responses to emotions in others (Zahavi, 2008;
Heberlein and Atkinson, 2009)?
Answering these questions about human emotion presents a
variety of challenges. Unlike the study of some other human cog-
nitive processes, the study of emotion benefits from the now
widely accepted fact that humans and non-human animals share
many emotional processes, enabling more, and more diverse
study paradigms on emotion (Panksepp, 2007; Panksepp and
Lahvis, 2011; LeDoux, 2012). A benefit of studying non-human
animals is that they enable critical experimental manipulations to
be performed, such as environmental manipulations that cause
intense, ecologically valid experiences like fear, and manipula-
tions of subcortical brain structures involved in emotion, such
as permanent or temporary lesions or genetic manipulations.
Gray and McNaughton argue that such techniques are essential
for drawing causal inferences about some emotional processes
(Gray and McNaughton, 2000). However, animals can provide
little information relevant other critical features of emotion,
such as information about subjective experiences. Research in
humans can target subjective experience, but, conversely, many
critical experimental manipulations of emotion are not feasi-
ble or ethical to perform in humans, such as intense, ecologi-
cally valid environmental manipulations or lesions to subcortical
structures.
One means of circumventing this conundrum is to con-
duct research in individuals affected by pathologies that provide
“natural experiments” in which emotional processes are altered,
enabling identification of the downstream effects. One example
is the use of case studies of individuals with lesions to specific
brain regions as a result of disease, injury, or surgical inter-
vention, such as the orbitofrontal cortex (Hornak et al., 2004),
insula (Phillips et al., 1997), or amygdala (Feinstein et al., 2011).
Such cases can yield rich and detailed evidence about the emo-
tional processes subserved by the damaged region. The downside
is that individuals in whom lesions are neuroanatomically spe-
cific enough to yield meaningful evidence are rare. Thus, few
researchers have access to these patients, and the possibility per-
sists that certain response patterns result from patient-specific
idiosyncrasies unrelated to the lesion. In addition, most brain
lesions occur in late adolescence or adulthood, precluding an
understanding of the developmental consequences of lesions to
structures like the amygdala, damage to which may result in
distinct behavioral outcomes in adulthood relative to infancy
(Amaral, 2003).
An alternative to lesion-based case studies is the study of pop-
ulations of patients affected by psychopathologies known to affect
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specific neurocognitive systems. Psychopathy, a cluster of behav-
ior tendencies and personality traits associated with callousness
and antisocial behavior, is one such form of psychopathology
(Hare, 1993; Blair et al., 2006; Skeem et al., 2011). Evidence is
accumulating to suggest impairments in the systems and pro-
cesses supporting fear responding in psychopathy, leaving other
systems largely intact (Lilienfeld et al., 2012; Patrick et al., 2012;
Rothemund et al., 2012). Psychopathy may therefore be a useful
empirical tool for understanding the nature of fear and perhaps
emotion more broadly.
In this review, I will consider how understanding psychopathy
can shed light on the three questions outline above: (1) Are emo-
tions discrete, qualitatively distinct phenomena or quantitatively
varying phenomena best described in terms of dimensions like
arousal and valence? (2) What are the brain structures involved
in generating specific emotions like fear, if any? And (3) how do
our own experiences of emotion pertain to our perceptions of and
responses to others’ emotion?
PSYCHOPATHY
Psychopathy is a disorder that is generally viewed as the conflu-
ence of core personality characteristics plus antisocial behavioral
tendencies, and which, in its extreme form, affects 1–2% of the
general population and as many as 50% of violent offenders
(Hare, 1993; Rutter, 2012). The core personality features associ-
ated with psychopathy are callous and unemotional personality
traits, which include a lack of empathy or remorse, weak social
bonds, an uncaring nature, and shallow emotional responding
(Cooke et al., 2005; Frick and White, 2008; Viding and McCrory,
2012). The antisocial behavior tendencies that tend to accom-
pany these traits include poor control of anger, impulsiveness,
irresponsibility, and a parasitic orientation toward others (Frick
and Ellis, 1999). These factors are generally positively related,
such that higher levels of callous and unemotional personal-
ity traits predict increased antisocial behavior (Viding et al.,
2007; Kahn et al., 2013). The presence of psychopathic traits
are particularly strong predictors of aggression that serves an
instrumental goal, such as bullying, sexual violence, or assault
during the course of a robbery (Blair, 2001; Woodworth and
Porter, 2002). Debates persist as to whether the features of
psychopathy are best classified using various two-, three-, and
four-factor models that have been proposed (Jones et al., 2006;
Skeem et al., 2011), and whether criminal or aggressive behav-
ior is an essential part of the psychopathy construct (Hare and
Neumann, 2010; Skeem and Cooke, 2010), however, the basic
features that compose the construct of psychopathy are generally
agreed upon.
Psychopathy is not a clinical diagnosis in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV-TR), although features of psy-
chopathy are incorporated into the Axis II diagnosis Antisocial
Personality Disorder (Lynam and Vachon, 2012). Various sugges-
tions for updating the DSM5 to reflect current conceptualizations
of psychopathy in adults and children have been proposed (Frick
and Moffitt, 2010; Skodol et al., 2011). That said, emerging evi-
dence suggests that psychopathy is not taxonomic in structure.
As is the case for traits that comprise other forms of mental
illness (Markon et al., 2011), psychopathic traits appear to be
continuously distributed in the population and can be most reli-
ably and validly assessed when treated as a continuous rather
than a discrete measure (Edens et al., 2006; Guay et al., 2007;
Kotov et al., 2011). This is important because it suggests that
information about psychopathy can be drawn from both clini-
cally diagnosed samples and community samples (Malterer et al.,
2010).
Psychopathy affects both children and adults. Markers of psy-
chopathy may emerge early in childhood (Glenn et al., 2007;
Wang et al., 2012), are moderately reliable predictors of adult psy-
chopathy (Lynam et al., 2008), and the core affective features of
psychopathy appear to be highly heritable (Larsson et al., 2006).
The heritability coefficient of the core callous and unemotional
features has been estimated to be at least 0.43 (Larsson et al.,
2006) and as high as 0.71 (Viding et al., 2005, 2008). An indi-
vidual’s risk for engaging in antisocial behavior during childhood
or adulthood can be increased by any number of life history
events, including trauma exposure, low socioeconomic status, or
delinquent peer groups (Lynam et al., 2008), but these factors
do not seem to precipitate the emergence of psychopathic traits
in children (often termed callous-unemotional traits). In fact,
callous-unemotional traits may paradoxically serve as a protec-
tive factor against parental maltreatment: among children with
callous-unemotional traits, there is little correspondence between
the quality of parenting that children receive and the severity
of their antisocial behavior problems (Wootton et al., 1997).
Instead it appears that life stressors that result in heightened stress
responding represent a distinct etiological route toward antiso-
cial behavior (Blair, 2001). Among children without high levels
of callous-unemotional traits, parental maltreatment is associated
with increased antisocial behavior (Wootton et al., 1997). In addi-
tion, antisocial behavior in the absence of callous-unemotional
traits does not appear to be highly heritable, supporting the role
of environmental stressors in leading to antisocial behavior in
the absence of callous-unemotional traits (Viding et al., 2005,
2008).
PSYCHOPATHY AND FEAR RESPONDING
From the earliest formal clinical descriptions of psychopathy, the
construct has been linked to deficient fear responding. Mostmod-
ern conceptualizations of psychopathy are based on the work of
Cleckley (1988), whose compiled observations of institutional-
ized psychopaths are described in The Mask of Sanity. He distin-
guishes psychopaths from other psychiatric patients as typically
free from delusions or irrational thinking, suicidality, or other
self-harm tendencies, and, in particular, from anxiety or fear. The
second criterion Cleckley specifies for identifying psychopathy is
an, “Absence of nervousness or psychoneurotic manifestations,”
and he describes the prototypical psychopath as “incapable of
anxiety” (p. 340) showing “immunity from . . . anxiety or worry”
(p. 339), and being “free from . . . nervousness” (p. 339).
Although Cleckley’s descriptions of psychopathy reflect a psy-
chodynamic orientation, his observations are consistent with
more recent experimental data assessing fear responding in
psychopathy. A focus on fear responding emerged from the
observation that psychopathic offenders are particularly likely to
re-offend, suggesting that the threat of future punishments is
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not sufficiently motivating for them (Corrado et al., 2004; Hare,
2006). Fear is, in essence, the state that accompanies the antic-
ipation of an aversive outcome (i.e., punishment) and promotes
avoidance and escape behaviors (Stein and Jewett, 1986; Panksepp,
1998; LeDoux, 2000). Fear being the emotion that promotes
avoidance of behaviors that result in punishment (LeDoux, 2003),
it is ostensibly is the mechanism by which punishing criminal
behavior serves to deter it. Early hypotheses proposed that dys-
functional fear responding renders psychopaths less likely to avoid
engaging in criminal behaviors that result in punishments like
imprisonment, and were supported by laboratory findings that
psychopaths are less likely to modulate their behavior in response
to anticipated punishments ranging from electrical shock to
loss of points in a computer game (Lykken, 1957; Hare, 1966;
Newman and Kosson, 1986; Blair et al., 2004).
Abundant psychophysiological research supports the notion
that psychopaths’ responses to the threat of an aversive outcome
are muted. Psychopathy impairs anticipatory skin-conductance
responses (Lykken, 1957; Aniskiewicz, 1979; Herpertz et al., 2001;
Birbaumer et al., 2005; Rothemund et al., 2012), fear-potentiated
startle responses (Patrick et al., 1993; Levenston et al., 2000;
Herpertz et al., 2001; Rothemund et al., 2012), and contrac-
tion of the corrugator muscle underlying the brows (Herpertz
et al., 2001; Rothemund et al., 2012) during threat anticipation.
Psychopathy also impairs aversive classical conditioning (Flor
et al., 2002) as well as other fear-relevant responses such as the
recognition of fear from the face, body, and voice (Marsh and
Blair, 2008; Dawel et al., 2012). These differences are particularly
evident for psychopathic offenders characterized as “primary”
psychopaths who exhibit the core callous and unemotional per-
sonality features of the disorder (Lykken, 1957; Aniskiewicz,
1979; Dawel et al., 2012). This is in contrast to “secondary”
psychopaths, in whom antisocial behavior may primarily reflect
social disadvantage or maltreatment and who may present with
increased anxiety (Newman et al., 2005; Kimonis et al., 2012).
Finally, both anecdotal reports and empirical evidence indicate
that subjective experiences of fear are reduced in psychopathy.
In Without Conscience (Hare, 1993), Hare describes an interview
with a psychopathic offender who seemingly fails to understand
the fundamental nature of fear:
Another psychopath . . . said that he did not really understand what
others meant by “fear.” However, “When I rob a bank,” he said, “I
notice that the teller shakes or becomes tongue-tied. One barfed
all over the money. She must have been pretty messed up inside,
but I don’t know why. If someone pointed a gun at me, I guess I’d
be afraid but I wouldn’t throw up.” When asked to describe how he
would feel in such a situation, his reply contained no references to
body sensations. He said things such as, “I’d give you the money”;
“I’d think of ways to get the drop on you”; “I’d try and get my ass
out of there.” When asked how he would feel, not what he would
think or do, he seemed perplexed. Asked if he ever felt his heart
pound or his stomach churn, he replied, “Of course! I’m not a
robot. I really get pumped up when I have sex or when I get into a
fight” (pp. 53–54).
Also supporting reduced subjective experience of fear in
psychopathy are the results of a recent study in which adolescents
with psychopathic traits and healthy controls underwent an
autobiographical recall paradigm adapted from a task devel-
oped to measure subjective experiences of emotion across cul-
tures (Scherer and Wallbott, 1994). In the task, participants
described recent emotionally evocative events and their sub-
jective responses during these events. This paradigm has the
advantage of using a single measure to assess responses to five
emotional states. Relative to controls, adolescents with psy-
chopathic traits reported reduced symptoms of sympathetic
nervous system activation, such as changes in breathing or mus-
cle tension, during fear-evoking events, even though judges
rated the psychopathic adolescents’ descriptions of the fear-
evoking events as no less inherently frightening than the events
reported by controls. In addition, psychopathic adolescents
reported that in daily life they experience fear less often and
less intensely than did controls (Marsh et al., 2011). Two ado-
lescents with psychopathic traits in this study reported never
having felt fear, an experience not reported by any of the healthy
adolescents.
In keeping with this pattern, many contemporary assess-
ments of psychopathy specifically index items related to reduced
anxiety and fearfulness. These measures include the Triarchic
Psychopathy Measure, e.g., “I’m afraid of far fewer things than
most people” (Patrick, 2010); the Youth Psychopathy Inventory
e.g., “What scares others usually doesn’t scare me” (Andershed
et al., 2002); and the Psychopathic Personality Inventory, e.g., “I
can remain calm in situations that would make many other peo-
ple panic” (Lilienfeld and Andrews, 1996). Researchers who use
psychopathy measures that do not explicitly include anxiety and
fear-relevant items often supplement the scale with anxiety mea-
sures or clinical assessments of anxiety disorders (Sutton et al.,
2002; Finger et al., 2008; Malterer et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2008;
Kimonis et al., 2012; Koenigs et al., 2012).
In contrast to fear, other forms of emotional responding
in psychopathy appear to be spared. The clearest example is
anger, which appears intact and perhaps enhanced in psychopa-
thy. Anger can be defined as the high arousal state that follows
frustration or perceived threat and, behaviorally, is closely linked
to aggression against the source of frustration or threat (Blair,
2012). Elevated anger responding is intrinsic to many descrip-
tions of psychopathy. Both Cleckley and Hare’s case studies
include numerous descriptions of psychopaths whose misbe-
havior included frequent temper tantrums and rage-induced
aggression. And contemporary measures of psychopathy univer-
sally feature items that index frequent, heightened, or under-
controlled displays and experiences of anger. These measures
include the youth and adult variants of the Psychopathy Checklist,
e.g., “Poor anger control” (Forth et al., 2003); the Antisocial
Processes Screening Device, e.g., “Becomes angry when corrected
or punished” (Frick and Hare, 2001); the Levenson Self-Report
Psychopathy Scale, e.g., “When I get frustrated, I often ‘let off
steam’ by blowing my top” (Levenson et al., 1995), and the
Psychopathic Personality Inventory, e.g., “From time to time
I really ‘blow up’ at other people” (Lilienfeld and Andrews, 1996).
That these criteria are positively correlated with the overall con-
struct reinforces the positive relationship between psychopathy
and anger experiences.
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In psychopathy, anger is most likely to result from goal frustra-
tion rather than perceived threat (Blair, 2012), although it should
be noted that considerably less empirical research has assessed
anger responding in psychopathy compared to fear. That said,
three recent studies have found psychopathy to be associated
with intact or heightened anger responding both physiologi-
cally and subjectively. Hicks and Patrick (2006) evaluated angry
responding using a series of self-report scales and found elevated
anger responding in psychopathy, with closer associations found
between angry responding and the antisocial behavior subscale.
In a similar vein, Blackburn and Lee-Evans (2011) found that
psychopathic participants anticipated that they would respond
with greater anger than non-psychopaths to a variety of anger-
inducing scenarios. Lobbestael et al. (2009) performed an anger
induction task in individuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder
(who varied in psychopathic traits), Borderline Personality
Disorder and controls. The induction task entailed recalling a sit-
uation in which subjects had experienced a conflict with another
person and had felt very angry, after which subjects spent sev-
eral minutes recalling the details of the event. Results indicated
that neither total psychopathy scores nor callous and unemotional
personality trait scores among individuals with antisocial person-
ality disorder were predictive of physiological changes during the
anger induction task, suggesting an intact anger response. Other
studies have found no group differences in responses linked to
anger, such as the study assessing subjective experiences of emo-
tion in psychopathic adolescents and controls (Marsh et al., 2011),
and the results of two meta-analyses assessing the recognition of
anger from the face, body, or voice (Marsh and Blair, 2008; Dawel
et al., 2012).
A second emotional state that appears to be intact in psy-
chopathy is positive excitement. This state can be distinguished
from happiness, which is more closely associated with goal attain-
ment, as the state that accompanies the anticipation of an appetitive
outcome (i.e., reward) and promotes acquisition or achievement of
the reward—a state that is in some ways a mirror image of fear
and that has been alternately termed wanting, seeking, or inter-
est (Berridge et al., 2009). The quotation from the incarcerated
psychopath above is suggestive of the presence of positive excite-
ment in psychopathy, and is consistent with clinical observations
and empirical data that psychopaths are positively motivated by
the prospect of reward, particularly near-term reward. Cleckley’s
criteria include several items that describe unrestrained goal-
seeking in the context of money, sexual gratification, and other
rewards (Cleckley, 1988). And, as is true for anger, contemporary
measures of psychopathy feature items related to the experience
of wanting, seeking, and excitement, including the Psychopathy
Checklist, e.g., “Stimulation seeking” (Forth et al., 2003); the
Youth Psychopathy Inventory, e.g., “If I get the chance to do
something fun, I do it no matter what I had been doing before”
(Andershed et al., 2002); the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy
Scale, e.g., “My main purpose in life is getting as many goodies as
I can” (Levenson et al., 1995), and the Psychopathic Personality
Inventory, e.g., “If I were a firefighter, I think I might actu-
ally enjoy the excitement of trying to rescue someone from
the top floor of a burning building” (Lilienfeld and Andrews,
1996). Empirical behavioral data also exist to suggest that the
motivational salience of rewarding stimuli is similar to that of
comparison samples (Blair et al., 2004) or perhaps even increased
(Scerbo et al., 1990; Bjork et al., 2012). Because positive excite-
ment is not always included on lists of basic emotion it is sub-
ject to less focused research than emotions like anger and fear.
However, what evidence exists suggests that this state is intact or
heightened in psychopathy.
There is very little evidence available that describes other
types of emotional reactions in psychopathy, although what evi-
dence exists suggests that disgust responding remains intact, and
there is little evidence for consistent impairments in happiness
or surprise (Marsh and Blair, 2008; Marsh et al., 2011; Dawel
et al., 2012). One emotion for which the present literature is
genuinely ambiguous is sadness, with meta-analytic findings gen-
erally showing some deficits in recognizing sadness expressions
in psychopathy, albeit less consistently and with generally smaller
effect sizes than for fear. Very little literature explores sadness
responses in psychopathy in other contexts, and results from these
studies are equivocal (e.g., Blair et al., 1995; Brook and Kosson,
2013) In general, the neurobiological basis of sadness is not as well
understood as that of fear, and further development of the neu-
rocognitive basis of sadness may be required to develop targeted
tasks assessing it in psychopaths.
It should be noted that among Cleckley’s original criteria is
“General poverty in major affective reactions” which is reflected
in items measuring shallow affect in contemporarymeasures such
as the PCL variants and APSD (Hare, 1991; Frick andHare, 2001).
However, Cleckley’s emphasis is primarily the quality of the anger,
excitement, etc. that psychopaths experience—how long-lasting
these states are, how consistent, and how “mature” their expres-
sion. Thus, whereas psychopaths may display outward signs of
rage and become “vexed,” “peevish,” or “resentful,” Cleckley pro-
poses that they do not experience “mature, wholehearted anger”
(Cleckley, 1988, p. 348). The lability or consistency of affective
reactions in psychopathy may be an important feature of the dis-
order. However, it remains the case that among basic emotions,
only in the case of fear does strong, consistent empirical evidence
support the existence of deficits in psychopathy.
ARE EMOTIONS DISCRETE NATURAL KINDS OR
CONSTRUCTED USING DIMENSIONS OF CORE AFFECT?
These patterns of observed emotional responding in psychopathy
may help to explicate a central ongoing question about emo-
tion, namely: can emotions be better described as qualitatively
distinct, for example, as discrete “basic emotions” or “natural
kinds” (Ekman et al., 1983; Izard, 1992; Panksepp, 2005) or as
quantitatively distinct, for example, as points along a circum-
plex defined by dimensions like arousal and valence (Russell and
Barrett, 1999; Barrett and Wager, 2006)? Recent years have seen a
protracted debate in the literature about how to most accurately
capture the nature of emotion (Barrett et al., 2007; Izard, 2007;
Panksepp, 2007; Tracy and Randles, 2011), with proposed mod-
els of emotion including not only basic emotion and dimensional
models, but also those that focus upon goal-relevant appraisals
of emotional stimuli (Moors et al., 2013), emotions as coping
responses (Roseman, 2013), and emotions as survival circuits
(LeDoux, 2012). An extended conversation about the strengths
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and weaknesses of these various views will not be reviewed in
full here, rather, the focus will be on the basic consideration of
whether different emotions (e.g., fear, anger) are best viewed as
qualitatively or quantitatively distinct.
Models that posit emotions to be qualitatively distinct, such
as “basic emotion” models, holds that a limited number of
emotions like fear, anger, and positive excitement emerge from
dissociable neurophysiological processes (Ekman et al., 1983;
Izard, 1992; Panksepp, 2005; Lench et al., 2011). These neu-
rophysiological processes are generally linked to activity in the
evolutionarily ancient subcortical structures of the midbrain,
striatum, and limbic system most commonly linked to emotion
(Panksepp, 2005; Vytal and Hamann, 2010). So, for example,
the generation of positive excitement is linked to activation
in a striatal circuit centered on dopaminergic neurons in the
nucleus accumbens (Ikemoto and Panksepp, 1999), whereas the
generation of fear is associated with activity in a circuit involv-
ing the periaqueductal gray, anterior and medial hypothalamus,
and amygdala (LeDoux, 2000). In this view, finer gradations
of experience result when basic emotions are modulated or
elaborated by higher-level cognitive processes controlled by the
cerebral cortex, but the emergence of qualitatively distinct emo-
tions is not dependent on these cortically-controlled processes
(Panksepp, 2005).
Models that posit emotions to be quantitatively distinct hold
that emotions like fear, anger, and happiness are best described
as points on one or more core dimensions. Core dimensions
typically proposed to distinguish among emotions are physiolog-
ical arousal or activation (low—high) and valence (bad—good)
(Bradley et al., 2001). [Some have proposed a withdrawal—
approach dimension as a substitute or supplement to the valence
axis (Wager et al., 2003; Christie and Friedman, 2004; van Honk
and Schutter, 2006)]. Arranged orthogonally, these dimensions
form a circumplex upon which emotions can be plotted and
quantitatively compared (Barrett and Russell, 1999; Russell and
Barrett, 1999; Colibazzi et al., 2010). Positive excitement is plot-
ted as high in arousal and positive in valence, and sadness is
low in arousal and negative in valence. Fear is typically plotted
as high arousal and strongly negative, as is anger (Russell and
Barrett, 1999). Further distinctions among emotions are thought
to reflect differences in cognitive construals of the events sur-
rounding the basic changes in arousal and valence. Thus, whether
an individual experiences anger or fear (which are similar in
terms of arousal or valence) may be shaped by interpretations
of neurophysiological changes in valence and arousal in light of
the eliciting stimulus and the individual’s idiosyncratic stores of
semantic knowledge, memories, and behavioral responses that
shape the subjectively experienced state (Russell, 2003). Under
this view, distinctions among experienced emotional states are
highly dependent on these cognitively complex processes, which
are subserved by a distributed network of regions of the cerebral
cortex (Lindquist et al., 2012).
These models generate distinct predictions to the question of
whether a disorder or lesion could result in a single emotion being
disabled without affecting the experience of other emotions. The
discrete emotions view would argue that a disorder or lesion that
resulted in dysfunction in the specific structures subserving a
particular emotion could affect the experience of one emotion
while leaving others intact. In contrast, the dimensional view
would require either that other emotions that are dimensionally
similar to the affected emotion also be affected, or that deficits in a
particular emotion would reflect dysfunction in cortically-driven
higher-level cognitive processes.
The case of psychopathy lends clear support to notion that
fear is qualitatively distinct from other emotions. In psychopa-
thy, the bulk of the clinical and empirical evidence points toward
the conclusion that fear responding is uniquely disabled, with
other high-arousal (positive excitement, anger) and negatively
valenced (anger, disgust) emotions remaining intact. The dimen-
sional view cannot easily explain why in psychopaths the high
arousal, negatively valenced state of anger is easily (perhaps too
easily) generated, whereas the high arousal, negatively valenced
state of fear is not. The problem cannot lie in a failure to fully
engage neurocognitive systems underlying either the arousal or
valence dimension, because psychopaths experience other high-
arousal emotions (positive excitement) as well as other negatively
valenced emotions (disgust). It also cannot result from some dif-
ficulty arising at the interaction of these axes, because anger and
fear are highly similar in terms of both dimensions. Models that
substitute a withdrawal—approach axis for a negative—positive
axis are no more successful; the two most strongly withdrawal-
linked emotions are disgust and fear, and there is no evidence for
disgust-based impairments in psychopathy.
Can cognitive construals of emotion explain the patterns
observed in psychopathy? Perhaps, one could argue, psychopaths
under threat are less likely to construe their negative, high-arousal
state as fear and more likely to construe it as anger compared to
non-psychopaths. So, for example, the psychopath whose inter-
view is transcribed above might interpret a pounding heart and
churning stomach as the angry response that accompanies a ten-
dency to respond aggressively. Another person might interpret
the same body symptoms as the fear that accompanies a ten-
dency to escape or submit. Theoretically, this explanation could
explain both the deficits in fear and a concomitant increase
in anger in this population. One could argue that, particularly
for studies that focus on subjective reports of emotion, group
differences in construal underlie the tendency of psychopaths
to underreport experiencing fear and overreport experiencing
anger.
This argument suffers two shortcomings. First, it is inconsis-
tent with psychophysiological findings of overall reduced arousal
during threat anticipation in psychopathy. As described above,
there are two major categories of anger elicitors: perceived threat
and goal frustration (Blair, 2012). The construal argument would
require that psychopaths experience arousal in response to threat,
but interpret this arousal as anger rather than fear. But the
evidence is clear that psychopaths (particularly primary psy-
chopaths) are no more likely than average to experience physi-
ological arousal under conditions of threat (Blackburn and Lee-
Evans, 2011)—and in fact, as described previously, show reduced
physiological responses, including reduced skin conductance,
potentiated startle, and corrugator muscle activity. This suggests
that threat anticipation results in neither fear nor anger in this
population. Psychopaths are, however, more likely than average
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to experience anger is in response to frustration (Blair, 2012).
Thus, rather than being chronically likely to construe any high
arousal state as anger, psychopaths appear more likely to experi-
ence anger primarily in response to frustrated attempts to achieve
a reward. That both frustration-based anger and positive excite-
ment (the state that reflects the anticipation of reward) are normal
or elevated in psychopathy is consistent with the notion that in
psychopaths the systems that govern anticipation of reward are
functional and perhaps even overactive while the systems that
govern threat anticipation are dysfunctional. A further concern
is that the construal explanation of emotion leaves unclear why
psychopathy might engender such a dramatic shift in emotional
experience. Such a phenomenon is particularly difficult to explain
in light of the high heritability coefficient found for psychopathy.
Cognitive construals of emotional states are thought to reflect the
individual’s autobiographical memories and semantic knowledge
of emotion prototypes, phenomena that are necessarily a result of
learning, rendering it unlikely that the tendency to construe one’s
emotional response to an event as fear versus anger would itself
be heritable.
The pattern of reduced fear responding to anticipated threat
observed in psychopathy, then, is more consistent with the view
that states like anger and fear reflect biologically coherent and
qualitatively distinct responses to particular eliciting stimuli.
Dimensions like valence and arousal are useful means of quanti-
tatively describing differences among subjective feeling states like
fear, anger, and positive excitement, but may not accurately reflect
the neurobiological origins of those states.
WHAT ARE THE BRAIN STRUCTURES INVOLVED IN
GENERATING SPECIFIC EMOTIONS LIKE FEAR?
If psychopathy is associated with specific deficits in fear respond-
ing, this not only supports the idea that emotions are qualitatively
distinct, it supports the corollary that specific neurophysiologi-
cal processes that support the fear response are also affected. A
key feature of models of discrete emotions is that distinct emo-
tions have dissociable neurophysiological correlates (Vytal and
Hamann, 2010). Ekman (1999) has argued:
The distinctive features of each emotion, including the changes
not just in expression but inmemories, imagery, expectations, and
other cognitive activities, could not occur without central ner-
vous system organization and direction. There must be unique
physiological [CNS] patterns for each emotion (p. 50).
Limited evidence exists to suggest specific patterns of periph-
eral nervous system activity that accompany discrete emotions
(Ekman et al., 1983; Christie and Friedman, 2004), however,
assuming that the origins of basic emotions are in the central
nervous system, most research in this vein has focused on the cen-
tral origins of emotions, specifically, the structures or networks
of brain structures in which activity supports the emergence of
particular emotions (Panksepp, 2007; Vytal and Hamann, 2010;
Lindquist et al., 2012).
The availability of non-human animal analogues has made
fear one of the best-studied emotions on a neuroanatomical
level. On the whole, the empirical data support the idea that
the amygdala, along with its efferent projections, is an essen-
tial structure for the generation of conditioned fear responses,
which account for the majority of experienced fear (Davis, 1992,
1997). [Unconditioned fear in response to specific events like
carbon dioxide-induced air hunger may rely on distinct neu-
ral pathways (Johnson et al., 2011; Feinstein et al., 2013)].
Extensive early evidence demonstrated that the amygdala plays
a crucial role in the creation of conditioned fear in rodents.
For example, lesions to the amygdala prevent rats from devel-
oping a conditioned fear response, like freezing in response
to a stimulus that predicts shock (Blanchard and Blanchard,
1972). Later studies clarified the roles of the various subnuclei
of the amygdala, demonstrating that the lateral nucleus is pri-
marily involved in the acquisition of the fear response whereas
the central nucleus is involved in both the acquisition and the
expression of conditioned fear responses (Davis, 1992; Wilensky
et al., 2006). The amygdala’s many efferent projections coordi-
nate autonomic and behavioral responses to fear eliciting stim-
uli. Projections from the central nucleus of the amygdala to
the lateral hypothalamus are involved in activating autonomic
sympathetic nervous system responses, and projections to the
ventrolateral periaqueductal gray direct the expression of behav-
ior responses, such as defensive freezing (Davis, 1992; LeDoux,
2012). The amygdala’s central role in coordinated fear respond-
ing can be demonstrated by electrical stimulation studies showing
that complex patterns of behavioral and autonomic changes
associated with fear responses result from stimulation of the
relevant regions of the amygdala (Davis, 1992). Heavy reliance
on animal models is justified in the study of fear responding
and the amygdala given how strongly conserved the amygdala
nuclei involved in responding to conditioned threats are across
species ranging from reptiles to birds to rodents to primates
(LeDoux, 2012).
Ethical and pragmatic considerations prevent experimental
paradigms employing electrical stimulation or ablation of the
amygdala from being undertaken in human subjects. However,
the advent of neuroimaging technologies have enabled consider-
able assessments of subcortical responses to a variety of emotional
stimuli, enough to provide a basis for seven meta-analyses that
have been conducted to assess patterns of brain activation in
response to specific emotions (Phan et al., 2002; Murphy et al.,
2003; Kober et al., 2008; Sergerie et al., 2008; Fusar-Poli et al.,
2009; Vytal and Hamann, 2010; Lindquist et al., 2012). The
findings from four of these meta-analyses support the role of
the amygdala in human fear responding. Phan and colleagues
reviewed 55 PET and fMRI studies (including 13 that assessed fear
responding) and found that fear specifically activated the amyg-
dala relative to other emotions (Phan et al., 2002). Sixty percent
of studies assessing fear responses observed an increased amyg-
dala response whereas fewer than 25% of other emotional tasks
resulted in amygdala activation increases. Murphy and colleagues
reviewed 106 PET and fMRI studies (Murphy et al., 2003) and
again observed the most consistent amygdala responses during
the induction or perception of fear relative to other emotions,
interpreting their data as consistent with amygdala specializa-
tion for fear. In neither meta-analysis was any other structure
observed to be consistently and selectively activated during fear
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paradigms. Fusar-Poli and colleagues included only fMRI studies
assessing responses to emotional faces, but again found height-
ened amygdala responses to fearful faces relative to other emo-
tional faces (Fusar-Poli et al., 2009). Finally, Vytal and Hamann
(2010) employed a more sensitive meta-analytic method, acti-
vation likelihood estimation (ALE), to analyze the results of 83
PET and fMRI studies of emotion (including 37 that assessed fear
responding) and again found strong support that the amygdala
is preferentially active during fear paradigms, and this activation
in this region differentiated fear from happiness, sadness, and
disgust.
Three recent meta-analyses did not yield findings that fear is
preferentially associated with amygdala activation. Two were con-
ducted by Feldman-Barrett and colleagues (Kober et al., 2008;
Lindquist et al., 2012). In the more recent analysis, Lindquist
and colleagues analyzed 91 fMRI and PET studies of emotion,
including 42 assessing fear (Lindquist et al., 2012). The authors
observed that, bilaterally, the amygdala was the most active brain
region during fear perception paradigms (although not signifi-
cantly more active during fear than other emotions), but that
the amygdala was not preferentially active during fear experi-
ence paradigms. The selection of studies in this meta-analysis may
account in part for the differential findings. For example, of the
nine fear-experience studies included in this analysis, six were
conducted by a group that uses primarily IAPS pictures (Lang
et al., 1999) and similar images to elicit disgust and fear (e.g.,
Stark et al., 2003; Schienle et al., 2005). These studies may be
problematic because many of the “fear” images they use explic-
itly depict strong non-fear emotional cues (human or animal
anger expressions) or depict events like a car accident or lava
covering a road that are unpleasant but not obviously fright-
ening. These meta-analyses also omitted pain anticipation and
mood induction tasks included in other meta-analyses that are
more directly relevant to fear experience (Murphy et al., 2003;
Vytal and Hamann, 2010). The third meta-analysis (Sergerie
et al., 2008) also excluded pain anticipation and mood induc-
tion tasks, in addition to employing a distinct analytical approach,
whereby the authors compiled the statistical effect sizes of all
studies of emotion (148 in total) that reported any activation in
the amygdala and its surrounding regions. This approach yielded
results showing amygdala activation that was stronger in response
to positive emotional stimuli than to any negative emotional
stimuli. Clearly, the conclusions drawn from the various meta-
analyses are divergent enough to leave questions remaining as
to whether the amygdala is in fact specifically implicated in fear
responding.
Can the study of psychopathy clarify the role of the amygdala
in fear experience? Perhaps, given the prominence of dysfunc-
tional fear responding in psychopathy, empirical support that
amygdala dysfunction underlies aberrant fear responding in psy-
chopathic participants would support the amygdala’s role in
fear. And indeed, early hypotheses about the brain basis of psy-
chopathy focused on potential amygdala dysfunction (Patrick,
1994; Blair et al., 2001). More recently, the results of both
functional and structural neuroimaging studies support these
hypotheses. Several studies have observed that psychopathy is
associated with reduced amygdala activation during the viewing
of fearful emotional facial expressions but not other expressions
like anger, a pattern that is independent of attentional processes
(Marsh et al., 2008; Dolan and Fullam, 2009; Jones et al., 2009;
White et al., 2012). A recent study also found that psychopa-
thy assessed in a community sample was also associated with
a failure to exhibit amygdala activation to fear-evoking state-
ments (Marsh and Cardinale, 2012b). Again, no group differences
were observed in this task when other emotionally evocative
statements were presented. (In addition, no main effect of fear
stimuli was observed in the amygdala across groups. This sug-
gests that amygdala responses to fear may fail to emerge in
neuroimaging studies when the sample contains an unusual pro-
portion of high psychopathy scorers.) Finally, a fear-conditioning
paradigm found that psychopaths’ failure to exhibit skin con-
ductance responses during the task was accompanied by reduced
activation in the amygdala and functionally connected regions of
the cortex, such as orbitofrontal cortex and insula (Birbaumer
et al., 2005).
These patterns of dysfunction may stem from structural
abnormalities in the amygdala, which have also been observed
in psychopathy. Structural abnormalities across multiple nuclei
in the amygdala have been observed in psychopathy (Yang et al.,
2009, 2010; Ermer et al., 2012). Yang and colleagues observed
not only significant bilateral volume reductions in the amyg-
dalae of adult psychopaths relative to controls controls, but also
surface deformations in the vicinity of the amygdala’s basolat-
eral, lateral, cortical, and central nuclei. A later study indicated
that these deformities are more significant in “unsuccessful” psy-
chopaths, or those who have been prosecuted for their criminal
acts (Yang et al., 2010). Ermer and colleagues identified gray mat-
ter reductions in adult psychopaths’ amygdalae, in addition to
other paralimbic regions such as parahippocampal gyrus (Ermer
et al., 2012). It should be noted that how specific nuclei of the
amygdala are involved in psychopathy is not yet clear, in part
due to insufficient spatial resolution of functional imaging scan.
Various hypotheses have been proposed regarding the role of dis-
crete nuclei in psychopathic symptoms (Blair, 2005a; Moul et al.,
2012).
On the whole, the results of these studies directly link amyg-
dala dysfunction to observed deficits in fear responding in psy-
chopathy.
But perhaps the most compelling evidence that amygdala dys-
function underlies fear deficits in psychopathy emerges from
the results of paradigms testing fear responding in psychopaths
and individuals with lesions to the amygdala. As previously
described, psychopathy has been found to impair anticipatory
skin-conductance responses (Lykken, 1957; Aniskiewicz, 1979;
Herpertz et al., 2001; Birbaumer et al., 2005; Rothemund et al.,
2012), fear-potentiated startle responses (Levenston et al., 2000;
Herpertz et al., 2001; Rothemund et al., 2012), aversive clas-
sical conditioning (Flor et al., 2002), subjective experiences of
fear (Marsh et al., 2011) and the recognition of fear from the
face, body and voice (Marsh and Blair, 2008; Dawel et al., 2012).
Striking parallels to these deficits can be found in studies of
individuals with amygdala damage. In these individuals, compa-
rable impairments in each of these fear paradigms have also been
observed (Table 1).
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Table 1 | Comparison of deficits observed in samples with psychopathy and amygdala lesions.
Psychopathy Amygdala lesions
Potentiated startle Levenston et al., 2000; Herpertz et al., 2001 Angrilli et al., 1996; Buchanan et al., 2004
Anticipatory SCR Hare, 1982; Ogloff and Wong, 1990; Rothemund et al., 2012 Bechara et al., 1995
Aversive conditioning Lykken, 1957; Flor et al., 2002 LaBar et al., 1995; Bechara et al., 1999
Facial fear recognition Blair et al., 2004; Marsh and Blair, 2008 Adolphs et al., 1994, 1999
Vocal fear recognition Blair et al., 2002, 2005 Scott et al., 1997; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1999
Postural fear recognition Munoz, 2009 Sprengelmeyer et al., 1999
Reduced subjective fear Marsh et al., 2011 Masaoka et al., 2003; Feinstein et al., 2011
Because amygdala dysfunction has been observed in psychopa-
thy during several of these tasks, and because amygdala lesions
impair performance in all of them, these patterns generate a
compelling case for the role of the amygdala specifically in fear
responding. Consistent with this, researchers studying one patient
with bilateral amygdala damage (SM) clarify that she has not only
striking deficits in fear responding, but these deficits are limited
to fear responding:
SM’s reaction to fear-inducing stimuli was not characterized by
a loss of responsiveness, but rather manifested as a heightened
arousal and interest in the face of a near-complete lack of avoid-
ance and caution . . .Our findings suggest that the amygdala’s
role in the induction and experience of emotion is specific to
fear. To say that SM is emotionless or unable to feel emotion
is simply false. Her emotional deficit is primarily circumscribed
to the behaviors and experiences that characterize a state of fear
(Feinstein et al., 2011).
The clear correspondence between patterns of fear dysfunc-
tion observed in psychopathy and following amygdala lesions,
in the absence of other clear emotional deficits, provides strong
support for the specific involvement of the amygdala in fear.
Dysfunction in the amygdala, whether via acquired lesion or
developmental psychopathology, impairs fear-related processes
while leaving other forms of emotion, such as anger, positive
excitement, and disgust, largely intact. In answer to our sec-
ond question, then, research in psychopathy suggests that the
amygdala—or,more likely, specific populations of neurons within
the amygdala (LeDoux, 2012)—plays a critical role in generat-
ing fear but does not appear to be critical for other emotions like
positive excitement and anger.
HOW DO OUR OWN EXPERIENCES OF EMOTION PERTAIN TO
OUR PERCEPTIONS OF AND RESPONSES TO OTHERS’
EMOTION?
The findings reviewed thus far suggest answers to a third question
of ongoing interest in psychology and neuroscience: how do our
emotional experiences affect our responses to and perceptions of
others’ emotions?
As we have seen, the evidence is clear that psychopathy is
associated with deficits in the experience of fear but not other
emotions. Psychopathic individuals show reduced physiological
responding during anticipation of an aversive event, are less apt
to adapt their behavior in response to punishment, and report
reduced subjective fear. In some psychopaths the experience of
fear may be essentially absent but, in keeping with the idea that
psychopathy is a continuum rather than a taxon, fear is likely
muted to varying degrees rather than absent in most individ-
uals with psychopathic traits. Finally, psychopathy impairs the
recognition of others’ fear. Three meta-analyses have now demon-
strated that psychopathy impairs recognition of fearful facial
expressions in the face, body, and voice (Marsh and Blair, 2008;
Wilson et al., 2011; Dawel et al., 2012), a pattern that is par-
ticularly closely associated with the central affective deficits of
psychopathy. Marsh and Blair (2008) found that responses to fear
are impaired to a significantly greater degree than any other emo-
tion, and Dawel et al. (2012) found that the core affective features
of psychopathy impaired the recognition of fear but not other
emotions. In addition, psychopathy impairs the ability to iden-
tify the circumstances under which others would experience fear,
such as in response to threats of harm (Marsh and Cardinale,
2012a). The parallels between psychopathic deficits in emotional
experience and emotion recognition are striking. The emotion
that psychopaths appear not to feel strongly—fear—is the same
emotion that they have the most difficulty recognizing in others.
Associations between the experience and recognition of emotion
have previously been observed for a number of emotions, includ-
ing fear (Buchanan et al., 2010). These data suggest the possibility
of a basic empathic failure in psychopaths—they have great diffi-
culty understanding an emotion in others that they themselves do
not feel (or at least, do not feel strongly). This breakdown appears
to occur in primarily for fear, rendering others’ expressions of fear
essentially meaningless in individuals with psychopathic traits.
These patterns are consistent with the theory that we recog-
nize others’ emotions through a low-level empathic simulation
process, exploiting our own experiences of an affective state to
understand others’ experiences (Goldman and Sripada, 2005).
Empathic simulation has become a favored explanation among
researchers studying empathy for pain, boosted by a voluminous
literature that the perception or inference of others’ pain results
in increased activation in the same brain structures involved in
processing affective and motivational features of felt pain (Lamm
et al., 2011). It is now widely agreed that the experience of empa-
thy for pain emerges from shared representations for personal and
vicarious experiences of affective states (Bernhardt and Singer,
2012).
The neurobiological evidence that empathy for fear also results
from shared neural representations is equally compelling: both
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experienced fear and perceived fear result in specific activation
in the amygdala, a structure that, when damaged or dysfunc-
tional (as in the case of psychopathy), leads to impairments
in both felt fear and the ability to recognize when others
are experiencing fear. And yet an extremely similar pattern
of data to support amygdala-based shared representations of
fear has been interpreted differently from evidence supporting
shared insula and anterior cingulate cortex-based representations
for pain.
Why might this be? For one, the functions of the amygdala
were first articulated in animal models, with a historical emphasis
on stimulus-reinforcement learning rather than social functions
and subjective experiences. This emphasis may have resulted in
early observations of amygdala activity in response to fear expres-
sions being interpreted as indicating that fear expressions signal
threat, akin to the CS+ in a conditioning trial (Breiter et al., 1996;
Morris et al., 1996). However, there is little empirical data to sup-
port the idea that fear expressions are interpreted as primarily
threatening. Indeed, fearful facial expressions have been shown to
be more strongly appetitive than aversive (Marsh et al., 2005b),
and to resemble the morphological appearance of an infantile
face (Marsh et al., 2005a) consistent with the idea that others’
fear elicits empathic concern. The assumption that fearful expres-
sions signify threat because they elicit amygdala activation may
be a case of erroneous reverse inference—an inference regarding
the psychological significance of a stimulus on the basis of neural
responses to it (Poldrack, 2008).
Alternate hypotheses exist as well, such as that amygdala
responses to fearful expressions reflect the amygdala’s role in
directing attention to the eyes of these expressions, which is crit-
ical to correctly identifying these stimuli (Dadds et al., 2006;
Han et al., 2012). This theory is supported by findings that
instructing both patients with amygdala lesions and children with
psychopathic traits to attend to the eyes of faces reduces fear
recognition deficits (Adolphs et al., 2005; Dadds et al., 2006).
But this theory is less clearly able to accommodate the facts
that psychopathy also impairs pre-attentive recognition of fearful
faces (Sylvers et al., 2011), that both amygdala lesions and psy-
chopathy impair recognition of vocalized fear, auditory stimuli
for which the relevance of attention directed to salient features
is unclear (Scott et al., 1997; Blair et al., 2002), and that psy-
chopathy impairs the recognition of written statements that evoke
fear (Marsh and Cardinale, 2012a). No low-level features of
fear-evoking statements distinguish them from any other emo-
tionally evocative statement, so there is no obvious mechanism
by which the redirection of attention would be relevant to iden-
tifying these stimuli. I suggest that the total available evidence
can be more parsimoniously interpreted under the hypothesis
that amygdala is essential to generating an internal representation
of fear, and that amygdala dysfunction in psychopathy impairs
this process, thereby impairing identification of others’ fear across
contexts (Marsh and Cardinale, 2012b). This theory has the ben-
efit of being consistent with the vast and consistent literature on
empathy for pain.
That low-level emotional processes may impair empathy for
fear in psychopathy may be particularly germane to an under-
standing of empathic processes more generally. “Empathy” is a
term plagued by multiple overlapping definitions that include
low-level emotional contagion, cognitive perspective-taking, and
empathic concern (de Waal, 2009). The form of empathy most
notoriously impaired in psychopathy is empathic concern, some-
times called sympathy, the inverse of which is callousness (Hare,
1991; Blair, 1995). By contrast, the evidence is clear that cognitive
empathy, or perspective-taking, is not impaired in psychopa-
thy (Blair, 2008; Jones et al., 2010; Schwenck et al., 2012). But
emotional contagion, defined as simple affectedness by another’s
emotional state (de Waal, 2009), is clearly affected, at least in
response to others’ fear. The accumulated literature on psychopa-
thy thereby suggests the possibility of critical links among emo-
tional contagion in response to others’ fear, recognition of others’
fear, and empathic concern (Nichols, 2001). It also reinforces the
importance of resisting the temptation to conflate the various
forms of empathy, which may rely on distinct neurobiological
processes.
From a societal perspective, understanding empathic deficits
for others’ fear may be the most important question of all that
the study of psychopathy helps to answer. Although amygdala
lesion cases can illuminate the amygdala’s role in fear, because
these lesions usually occur in late adolescence or adulthood, their
effects on the development of other brain regions and behavior
is more limited. This may be why amygdala lesions in adulthood
are not associated with heightened aggression, whereas the case
of psychopathy suggests a strong relationship between develop-
mental deficits in fear and aggression. Fear plays an important
role in preventing or ending aggression during social encoun-
ters (Blair, 1995, 2005b), and fearful emotional facial expressions
elicit empathic concern and the desire to help from people who
perceive them, even subliminally (Marsh and Ambady, 2007).
The rationale for much research on psychopathy is that indi-
viduals with this disorder are responsible for a disproportionate
amount of suffering, as they engage in a variety of antisocial,
criminal, and violent behaviors that cause others distress and fear
(Hare, 1993; Rutter, 2012). There is limited evidence that failure
to exhibit empathic responses to others’ pain is related to lower
self-reported empathic concern or aggressive or antisocial behav-
ior (Singer et al., 2004, 2006). In contrast, the evidence linking
the failure to exhibit empathic responses to others’ fear, both on
a neural and a behavior level, is abundant. Psychopaths, in whom
the failure to recognize others’ fear or to generate empathic activa-
tion in the amygdala and autonomic nervous system is a hallmark
feature, exhibit profound impairments in empathic concern for
others and notoriously commit antisocial acts. Thus, as important
as the study of psychopathy is for answering fundamental psycho-
logical and neuroscientific questions about the nature of emotion
and empathy, an improved understanding of emotion and empa-
thy as they pertain to psychopathy may be critical to developing
improved means of ameliorating psychopaths’ harmful effects on
others.
CONCLUSIONS
The study of psychopathy has generated information relevant
to addressing three questions of central importance to emo-
tion and affective neuroscience. Evidence collected from psy-
chopathic populations supports the conclusion that fear is
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qualitatively distinct from other emotions and arises from dis-
crete neurobiological processes, rather than the conclusion that
emotions like fear and anger reflect quantitative variations in
core dimensions like arousal and valence. Recent neurocogni-
tive and neuroimaging evidence also supports the specific role
of the amygdala in generating a fear response over the view that
the amygdala plays a domain-general role equally relevant to
the generation of multiple emotions. And finally, psychopaths’
parallel deficits in experiencing fear and recognizing fear in oth-
ers lend support to the notion that empathy for affective states
results from shared representations for personal and vicarious
experiences of fear, consistent with simulation-based theories of
empathy. These conclusions may prove useful not only in further-
ing the neuroscientific studies of emotion, but in developing a
better understanding of the fundamental nature of psychopathy,
empathy and aggression.
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